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The phrase ‘judicial power’ is an evocative one whose beauty — or danger — is to a large 
extent in the eye of the beholder. For some, the possession by the judicial branch of powers 
with real bite, up to and including powers of constitutional review, is a precondition of 
liberal democracy. For others, however, ‘judicial power’ conjures up something quite 
different — including the potential of curial authority to threaten democracy, and a 
corresponding imperative that such authority be approached with caution and rigorously 
cabined. Of course, the difficult questions, as always, arise other than at the extremes, where 
judges would respectively lack any power to uphold constitutional standards or, conversely, 
be free to run amok. The hard question is thus one of degree. Judicial power, in any rule of 
law-based system, is a given. But how much is too much?  
There are many ways in which that question can be, and has been, approached. One 
possibility involves using constitutional or political theory as the predominant lens, with the 
aim of developing a model of democracy that prescribes, among other things, the legitimate 
extent and nature of the judicial role. In this article, however, I take a different, less abstract 
approach, by examining the question of judicial power within a particular temporal and 
jurisdictional context — namely, the United Kingdom today, where a recent and prominent 
strand of opinion holds that the judiciary is guilty of overreach, and that ‘judicial power’ is 
therefore something that needs not only to be watched, but to be scaled back.1  
In this paper, I take the unease that animates that school of thought and use it as a starting-
point. I do not, however, set out to prove that those who express such sentiments are right or 
wrong. Rather, I seek to make sense of how the UK has arrived at the position in which it 
currently finds itself and consider in general terms how — given the particularities of the 
UK’s constitutional system — one might go about identifying the proper limits of judicial 
power. I therefore begin by addressing the key constitutional parameters by reference to 
which the notions of judicial power and overreach have traditionally been calibrated. I then 
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trace the many senses in which the exercise of judicial power has grown, and consider the 
forces that have brought such developments about. Against that background, I contend that 
while the evolution of the judicial role evidences a reconceptualization, as distinct from the 
repudiation, of relevant fundamental constitutional principles, it should not be assumed that 
the UK constitution’s famous flexibility is limitless. To that end, I conclude by examining the 
recent and controversial Supreme Court judgments in Evans2 and Miller3 in which, in 
different ways, the proper limits of judicial power have been tested.  
Traditional parameters 
The setting of institutional parameters is a core function of any ‘constitution’ properly so-
called. In seeking to discern the location of such parameters, the constitutional text is, in 
most systems, the natural starting point, even if it can serve as no more than a point of 
departure. In the UK, however, the identification of relevant parameters must necessarily 
proceed in a different way. That is so most obviously because of the absence of any 
constitutional text per se. But there is the further (and related) point that the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty means that dividing lines that trace the respective provinces of 
different constitutional actors are mutable and implicit to an extent that is likely to be 
unfamiliar to those accustomed to the relative rigidity and formality of textual 
constitutionalism. Notions of constitutional propriety are thus informed in the UK to a 
peculiar degree by accretions of understanding and consensus born of institutional practice 
and interaction. And if institutional practice changes, the question arises of whether that 
evidences a challenge to or a shift in the prevailing consensus. It is against that background 
that the growth of judicial power in the UK in the recent past falls to be considered. In 
addressing such matters, the middle of the last century forms a useful benchmark, as the 
development of administrative law began to gather pace. When the role played by the courts 
in the public law sphere at that time is examined, it becomes clear that a number of 
constraints were generally considered to apply. Three such ‘traditional parameters’ are 
particularly noteworthy.   
The first is the principle of parliamentary sovereignty — and, in particular, the relatively 
straightforward and unqualified terms in which it was acknowledged. The resulting dynamic 
was one that situated Parliament firmly in the driving seat, the courts’ role being to take the 
legislation enacted by Parliament and give effect to it in the way that best implemented the 
intention that Parliament was taken to have had. The notion that courts might decline to 
enforce duly enacted legislation was not just anathema, it was unheard of;4 but the 
sovereignty principle exerted a penumbral effect that went well beyond that limitation upon 
the judicial role.5 The idea might be summed up in terms of judicial subservience to 
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Parliament — as distinct from judicial engagement with Parliament on the more equal 
constitutional terms that can be inferred from some of the contemporary jurisprudence.  
Second, if we shift our focus from the judicial-legislative to the judicial-administrative 
interface, we encounter a second well-established axiom: the appeal-review distinction. This 
is rooted in the related (albeit distinct) divisions that are drawn between questions 
pertaining respectively to the legality and merits of executive policies, rules and decisions, 
and between evaluations of matters of process and substance. Here, there has been 
substantial movement in recent decades. Turn back the clock to the middle of the 20th 
century, and the appeal-review distinction is nothing less than an article of constitutional 
faith, as adherence to the strictures of the Wednesbury unreasonableness doctrine 
illustrates.6 However, as we will see, the picture today is different.  
Third, the judicial-administrative interface — and the proper extent of judicial intervention, 
in particular — has traditionally been shaped by a further notion: the concept of 
justiciability. In its traditional form, this was taken to mean that certain matters were to be 
treated as extra-judicial not in the relatively subtle sense that courts should examine them 
only reluctantly or marginally (as is the case, at least on an orthodox account, with 
substantive review of merits questions), but in the absolute sense that they should not be 
examined by courts at all. Such issues have traditionally been identified, often in broad-
brush terms, by reference to their subject-matter — an approach that is perhaps epitomised 
by Lord Roskill’s judgment in the GCHQ case,7 in which the House of Lords’ willingness to 
acknowledge the in-principle reviewability of decisions made under prerogative powers was 
substantially hollowed out by the long list of prerogatives that were said to be non-
justiciable. In contrast, the notion of justiciability is viewed today in far less rigid terms.  
The foregoing parameters that traditionally shaped the judicial role were not plucked out of 
thin air. They draw upon and are inspired by the trinity of fundamental principles — the 
sovereignty of Parliament, the rule of law and the separation of powers — that lend a 
normative dimension to the UK’s uncodified constitutional order. But the traditional 
parameters reflect only certain aspects of those fundamental principles: in particular, 
aspects that emphasise the constitutional value of legislative and administrative functions 
while, at least to extent, postulating judicial power as a potential threat to them. For 
instance, the rule of law was traditionally perceived, at least to an extent, in a way that 
emphasised restrictions upon the courts’ function as much as anything else. This is apparent 
when the role of the ultra vires doctrine — which supplied the conventional theoretical basis 
for the judicial review jurisdiction — is considered.8 Under that approach, the courts’ job was 
centrally understood in terms of a limited notion of the rule of law, the emphasis being 
firmly upon ensuring that legislative boundaries upon administrative authority were not 
transgressed. Rooting the courts’ judicial review function firmly in the notion of upholding 
the sovereign will of Parliament served to cloak the exercise of that function with 
constitutional propriety. But it simultaneously served to constrain the courts’ role, not least 
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by denying, or at least marginalising, any role in relation to the supervision of the 
administrative branch that the judiciary might be thought to be have independent of the 
effectuation of legislative will. Indeed, a common thread that joins traditional 
understandings of the judicial role involves the viewing of other constitutional principles 
through the lens of parliamentary sovereignty, in ways that serve to underscore the limits of 
the judicial role and that (correspondingly) serve to emphasise the importance of respect 
both for parliamentary authority itself and for the authority of Parliament’s administrative 
delegates.  
Against this background, what we are witnessing today in the UK boils down to a tension 
between two visions of the constitutional order. As we have seen, the first — the traditional 
— vision places the sovereignty of Parliament centre stage and refracts other constitutional 
principles, and hence the judicial role, through it. But a competing vision postulates a 
different dynamic: one that acknowledges fundamental constitutional principles’ capacity to 
influence and shape one another, and that therefore gives rise to a different understanding of 
the judicial role — one that is informed to a greater degree by constitutional principles’ 
potential to drive, as well as constrain, judicial intervention. I return to this idea below. First, 
however, it is necessary to put some flesh on the bones, by examining the ways in which the 
judicial role has developed in recent decades. The changes have been multifarious, and the 
following amounts to nothing more than selected highlights.  
Development of the judiciary’s constitutional role 
Administrative law has enjoyed a notable renaissance over the course of the last 70 or so 
years. In 1951 — moved to do so by the Privy Council’s decision in Nakkuda Ali v Jayaratne,9 
in which requirements of procedural fairness were held not to apply to a so-called 
‘administrative’ licensing function — Sir William Wade wrote of the ‘twilight of natural 
justice’.10 Subsequently, however, as is well known, the principle of natural justice in 
particular, and administrative law more generally, awoke from what Sir Stephen Sedley 
dubbed its ‘long sleep’,11 as is evidenced by such seminal decisions as Ridge v Baldwin,12 
Anisminic13 and Padfield.14 Such cases might be thought of as emblematic of an initial phase 
of the renaissance, which to some extent — Ridge v Baldwin being a prime example of this — 
restored old orthodoxies that had been eroded during English administrative law’s slumber. 
But just as the renaissance artists did not simply replicate that from which they took their 
inspiration, so the English judges who became the architects of modern administrative law 
went well beyond mere restoration of that which had gone before. Thus entirely new grounds 
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of judicial review, such as the doctrine of legitimate expectation, emerged,15 developed,16 and 
continue to be refined17, while long-established grounds — such as error of law — have been 
developed almost beyond recognition18 (and, arguably, utility).19  
These expansions of judicial review’s doctrinal tentacles have been accompanied by other 
developments pertaining to its depth and scope. As to the former, the appeal-review 
distinction has been refined, albeit not eschewed, through the emergence of an ‘anxious 
scrutiny’ form of reasonableness review20 and the embrace, in certain contexts, of 
proportionality.21 Meanwhile, judicial review today extends not only to questions about the 
existence22 but also the lawfulness of the exercise23 of prerogative powers, as well as to the 
exercise of some other non-statutory powers.24 At the same time, the courts have to some 
extent shrugged off the constraints imposed by the concept of justiciability, moving away 
from the categorical approach of GCHQ, and towards a more subtle one that focusses upon 
the appropriateness of judicial engagement with the particular issue raised by the claimant.25  
Meanwhile, on a more explicitly constitutional plane, courts have exhibited increasing 
enthusiasm for the ‘principle of legality’ as a constitutional tool of statutory construction and 
for the allied notion of ‘common law constitutional rights’.26 A related but distinct 
development has been the emergence ‘constitutional statutes’27 and, more recently, of the 
idea that such statutes may be imbued with subtly varying degrees of constitutionality — a 
property that informs the extent of their vulnerability to implied repeal — depending upon 
the normative worth of the constitutional values that they institutionalise.28 All of this has 
been coupled with an interpretive approach that has, at least on occasions, been notably 
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bold,29 and that might be considered, in some instances, to be a functional form of ‘soft 
strike-down’.30 Indeed, questions have explicitly been raised about judges’ fidelity to statute, 
including by judges themselves, who have suggested — not only extra-curially31 but also from 
the bench32 — that, in extremis, they might be prepared to disregard a statutory provision on 
the ground of its constitutionally offensiveness.  
Paradoxically, the likelihood of such a judicial nuclear option being exercised is considerably 
lessened by the strengthening of the courts’ authority in other respects, most obviously via 
the Human Rights Act 1998. This not only gives the courts extensive powers — and, indeed, 
duties — of constitutional interpretation,33 which they have on occasions used with notable 
gusto,34 but also authorises them to declare that primary legislation is incompatible with 
relevant rights.35 And the latter, far from the anodyne non-remedy that it may appear to be, 
is in fact a potent device that invokes at least the prospect of binding adjudication by the 
European Court of Human Rights, thereby enabling British judges denied strike-down 
powers by the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty to appropriate for domestic purposes 
the constraining forces to which the UK is subject in international law by dint of its treaty 
obligations. Meanwhile, until the UK exits the European Union, domestic judges remain 
capable of refusing to apply domestic legislation that conflicts with directly effective EU 
law,36 and have acquired a fresh constitutional role thanks to devolution, where questions 
can and do arise about whether territorial legislatures have exceeded their powers by (for 
instance) legislating in breach of protected human rights37 or encroaching upon matters 
reserved to the UK Parliament.38 
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Judicial power, legislative will and parliamentary sovereignty 
The various changes to the judicial role charted above can be organised in a variety of ways. 
Certain themes, for instance, emerge, such as a growing emphasis upon rights; the 
internationalisation of UK constitutional law through the impact of the ECHR (via the HRA) 
and (for the time being) EU membership; the increasingly layered character of the British 
constitution thanks to devolution and (again for now) EU membership; judicial anxiety in 
the light of the growth of the administrative state and concern about the efficacy of political 
mechanisms of control; and a greater willingness, evidenced by the development of such 
constructs as constitutional rights and constitutional statutes, to engage in adjudication that 
is explicitly ‘constitutional’, the absence of a constitutional text per se notwithstanding.  
For present purposes, however, a further way of organising the various expansions of the 
judicial role is pertinent — bearing in mind the points made above about the way in which 
parliamentary sovereignty has traditionally operated, as a double-edged sword, so as to 
simultaneously serve as a root of and as a limit upon judicial authority. Viewed thus, 
organising recent changes to the judicial role by reference to the extent of any relevant 
parliamentary authorisation is instructive. And to that end, a continuum might be visualised, 
at one of which judges act with Parliament’s clear imprimatur. As we move along the scale, 
however, the relationship between parliamentary authority and judicial intervention 
becomes less obvious, until, at the far end, we encounter circumstances in which the two are 
either unaligned or even misaligned. Some examples, arranged at four points along this 
continuum, will help to illustrate the point.  
First, then, are situations in which the curial role has grown thanks to the exercise of 
functions explicitly conferred upon judges by legislation. The HRA is a good example. It 
requires judges to exercise new interpretive powers, so as to reconcile UK law and the ECHR 
whenever possible,39 and invests certain courts with a novel remedial power, enabling them 
to issue a declaration of incompatibility when such interpretive reconciliation is deemed 
infeasible.40 Similar considerations apply in respect of the functions that courts have 
acquired as the arbiters of the constitutional demarcation disputes that can now arise thanks 
to devolution; the courts may have broken new ground by adjudicating upon such matters, 
but they have done so at the explicit behest of Parliament. This is not to deny that questions 
about overreach can arise when courts exercise such legislatively conferred constitutional 
functions. If, for instance, such functions are conferred in relatively open-textured terms, 
questions can readily arise about how far judges can properly go in exercising such powers.41 
But legislative conferral serves at least in broad terms to legitimise the exercise of the 
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function, particularly if one adopts a constitutional paradigm that places particular weight 
upon the principle of parliamentary sovereignty.  
Second, situations arise in which the extension of the judicial role — in the sense of judges 
innovating in ways that enhance the scope for constitutional adjudication — is attributable to 
statutory intervention, even if it does not straightforwardly involve doing things that statute 
explicitly requires. Take, for example, the notion of constitutional statutes. The anvil upon 
which this idea has been beaten out is the UK’s membership of the European Union — and, 
specifically, the difficult questions that it raises about the relationship between the principles 
of the sovereignty of the UK Parliament and the primacy of EU law. In Thoburn,42 Laws J 
made an important contribution in this regard. He characterised the European Communities 
Act 1972 (ECA), which gives domestic effect to and provides for the domestic priority of EU 
law, as a ‘constitutional statute’. Membership of this novel category, it was said, signified the 
Act’s immunity from implied repeal. On this view, the ECA continues to operate — and so 
ascribe effect and priority to EU law — even in the face of primary legislation that is contrary 
to relevant EU norms, unless the ECA is explicitly overrideen. That idea was subsequently 
developed and refined by the Supreme Court, again in the EU context, in HS2,43 and was also 
applied, in a different context, in H v Lord Advocate.44 Judicial articulation of a category of 
constitutional statutes represents a notable departure from the Diceyan orthodoxy that all 
Acts of Parliament are of equal status in legal (if not in political-constitutional) terms.45 This, 
in turn, evidences a significant exercise of judicial power in terms of contributing to the 
development of the constitutional order itself. But the point of departure was a conundrum 
that Parliament had created. By enacting the ECA, it left the courts with little choice but to 
acknowledge the priority of EU over domestic law and to fashion an intelligible framework 
within which such prioritisation could be constitutionally rationalised. The notion of 
constitutional statutes thus does not amount to the straightforward implementation of 
Parliament’s will; but it is nonetheless a measured judicial response to an issue that was 
legislatively created.  
A third point on the continuum is represented by exercises of judicial power that are neither 
explicitly directed nor otherwise precipitated by statute. Here we find, among other things, 
such notions as common law constitutional rights and judicially articulated grounds of 
review that do not, at least in any straightforward sense, amount to the implementation of 
legislative will. Such developments are thus liable to be regarded with suspicion if a view of 
the constitutional order is adopted that places parliamentary sovereignty front and centre, 
given that the effect of such a constitutional worldview is to marginalise or deny other 
constitutional principles’ independent capacity to legitimise the extension and exercise of 
judicial authority.   
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If the third point on the continuum is characterised by judicial power that is wielded in the 
absence of any specific legislative imprimatur, the fourth point is where we encounter 
judicial interventions that are not merely independent of specific manifestations of 
legislative will, but which are (or at least appear to be) positively in tension with it. Perhaps 
the clearest example is supplied by legislative ouster clauses and judicial responses thereto, 
the Anisminic case46 being a celebrated example of curial unwillingness to take such a 
provision at face value and instead to interpretively neutralise it or (as Sir William Wade 
notably argued) baldly disobey legislation that flouts the rule of law.47 Anisminic is now 
joined by the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Evans,48 to which I return in the final 
section of the article.  
On thin ice?  
Looked at from a traditional perspective, judges might be thought to be on thinner and 
thinner constitutional ice as we move along the continuum sketched above. They find 
themselves on the strongest ground when what they do can be characterised in terms of the 
performance of a statutorily assigned function, the sovereign legislature’s imprimatur being 
the ultimate touchstone of constitutional legitimacy (on this view). But exercises of judicial 
power become more questionable as their relationship with legislative will diminishes — 
and, by the time the fourth point on the spectrum is reached, is ultimately inverted. 
According to this analysis, the constitutional ice grows progressively thinner because it 
primarily consists, in the first place, of parliamentary authorisation of the judicial enterprise. 
It was, for instance, for precisely such reasons that it was traditionally thought necessary, by 
way of the ultra vires doctrine, to characterise judicial review in terms of the implementation 
of legislative will. Thus, once we reach the fourth point on the continuum, the ice is not 
merely thin, but wholly incapable of bearing the weight placed upon it by what must, on this 
view, be considered improper judicial activism.  
At least some recent accretions of judicial power thus begin to look highly suspect, the 
erosion of the parameters that traditionally constrained the judicial role reducing to a 
challenge to fundamental constitutional principles themselves. However, a competing 
interpretation of recent history paints a less dramatic picture. On this view, at least most 
recent developments imply not the repudiation of fundamental principles, but rather serve 
as evidence of evolving understandings concerning their weight and relationality. By this I 
mean that the preponderant weight conventionally assigned to the sovereignty of Parliament 
has been revised, and the relative weight of other principles, including the rule of law and the 
separation of powers, has been reassessed. In this way, the three key principles that form the 
normative heart of the UK’s unwritten constitution are increasingly considered in co-equal 
terms. This alternative view treats the parameters that traditionally conditioned the judicial 
role not as fixed and brittle constraints, but as mutable and contestable inferences drawn 
from the fundamental principles that animated them in the first place. It follows that the 
repudiation of those parameters in favour of different — and, from a judicial perspective, 
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more generous — ones does not necessarily imply the repudiation of the underlying 
principles. This is not, however, to suggest that those parameters have been, or are ever 
likely to be, rendered entirely irrelevant. That is so not least because the kernel of each 
reflects constitutional principles that are deep-rooted, such that departure from them would 
be difficult to contemplate absent some form of crisis-evidencing constitutional rupture. 
Importantly, however, when we move beyond the very centre of the propositions that the 
parameters convey, we quickly also move beyond constitutional axioms that are so hallowed 
as to be unyielding. Viewed in this way, the ‘traditional parameters’ are simply a snapshot of 
an institutional accommodation that obtained at a given point in time.  
Take, for example, the appeal-review distinction. At one time, it was an article of British 
constitutional faith that courts should not examine the substance of administrative decisions 
other than by asking whether they were so irrational as to be outrageous.49 In contrast, the 
courts are today prepared — in some circumstances, such as when a relevant ECHR right,50 a 
common law constitutional right,51 a fundamental status52 or a substantive legitimate 
expectation53 is at stake — to intervene if the relevant matter has been disproportionately 
impacted by the administrative decision in question. This might seem to imply that the 
courts have simply cast off former restrictions, and have begun asserting new powers that 
are at odds with their proper constitutional role. The reality, however, is far more complex, 
and serves as a helpful illustration of the various forces that have operated so as to refashion 
the judicial role in recent decades.  
For one thing, when relevant ECHR rights are involved, the HRA in effect requires 
proportionality review, thus implicating the points raised in the previous section about 
legislative allocations of judicial authority. And while the HRA is not relevant when ECHR 
rights are not in play, the very fact that Parliament has sanctioned judicial recourse to 
proportionality by enacting the HRA cannot be ignored, not least because it signals a view on 
the part of Parliament that it is not inevitably improper for courts to engage in 
proportionality review. It would, however, be naïve — and ahistorical — to suggest that 
courts have taken themselves to be permitted to engage in proportionality review only 
because Parliament has sanctioned it. Their willingness to resort to proportionality in 
relation to such matters as substantive legitimate expectations — in which the HRA is 
implicated neither directly nor analogically — evidences a judicial commitment to the rule of 
law value of legal certainty as well as a preparedness to engage in relatively intensive review 
absent parliamentary authorisation. This, in turn, implies a judicial conviction that the 
constellation within which the three fundamental constitutional principles are arranged 
differs from that which was implicit in earlier thinking that took Wednesbury review to mark 
the outer limit of the curial role in judicial review cases.  
                                                        
49 See, eg, Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 
223; Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 418. 
50 See, eg, R (Quila) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] 1 AC 621. 
51 See, eg, R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51.  
52 See, eg, Pham v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2015] 1 WLR 1591. 
53 See, eg, R (Nadarajah) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 1363. 
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But none of this implies disregard for — as distinct from fresh thinking about — those 
principles. Indeed, recent developments in the area of substantive review can be understood 
as an attempt to take the thinking that underpinned the crude, binary appeal-review 
distinction, and fashion something that is more subtle but which remains true to the kernel 
of constitutional principle that gave rise to that distinction. Thus it is not the case that UK 
courts are today willing to second guess the administrative branch, boldly substituting 
executive decisions with judicial ones. Even in HRA cases, where proportionality is 
legislatively sanctioned, courts have shown themselves willing to tread cautiously, most 
obviously by developing a doctrine of deference that modulates the intrusiveness of 
proportionality review. This ensures that courts remain sensitive — when relevant — to other 
branches’ claims of democratic legitimacy and institutional competence. Proceeding thus is 
respectful of the possibility for constitutional mischief that inspired the appeal-review 
distinction as it was originally refracted, in a more severe form, through the Wednesbury 
doctrine, but in a way that is less dogmatic and that exhibits greater sensitivity to the fact 
that the relevant constitutional concerns will exert more or less force depending upon the 
context.54   
The limits of constitutional flexibility 
My purpose in this article has not been to closely analyse every respect in which judicial 
power has grown in the UK in recent decades, far less to argue that no exercise of that power 
has led the courts to exceed the bounds of constitutional propriety. Rather, I have attempted 
to show that while a clear direction of travel can be discerned, and while the associated 
expansion of curial authority challenges the parameters that have traditionally been 
understood as constraining it, this need not be taken to imply a repudiation of the 
underlying constitutional principles that gave rise to those parameters. Indeed, the UK 
system, lacking allocations of institutional power that are authoritatively fixed in place by a 
constitutional text, depends upon institutions interacting in a way that facilitates the 
emergence (and sometimes the evolution) of a form of constitutional equilibrium: that is, a 
tacit understanding about how such institutions are to relate to one another, about where the 
boundaries upon their respective roles and powers are to be found, and about the underlying 
values and principles by reference to which such issues fall to be negotiated. In such 
circumstances, we should not be surprised if, over time, ideas evolve about what a proper 
constitutional balance looks like. Lacking the sort of hard limits that a paramount 
constitutional text is capable of laying down, the institutional parameters found within the 
British constitution are inevitably softer, and potentially more transitory, in nature.  
However, that the nature of the UK constitutional order is such that the perimeters of 
institutional authority are far from neatly tabulated should not be taken to mean that the 
resulting flexibility is infinite. The role played by inter-institutional negotiation — as powers 
are exercised, limits tested and reactions taken on board — does not strip the constitution of 
any normative content. Rather, that process of institutional negotiation takes place against 
the background of and is centrally informed by senses of constitutional propriety that are 
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rooted in a fundamental principles. In the light of this, it is certainly not the case that the 
constitution generally, or the constraint it implies upon the judicial role, is limitlessly 
flexible. Griffith was therefore wide of the mark, at least in this regard, when he asserted 
that, in the UK, ‘Everything that happens is constitutional.’55  
Against this background, I turn, by way of conclusion, to Evans and Miller: two of the UK 
Supreme Court’s most controversial recent decisions. Both cases, I contend, have something 
to contribute if we are seeking to develop a sense of what judicial overreach may look like in 
the UK context: not because either unarguably constitutes overreach, but because they flag 
up two matters that are of central importance. Evans demonstrates that in assessing whether 
a court is guilty of overreach, it is necessary to move beyond crude and straightforward 
understandings of constitutional principle. Instead, we must acknowledge that such 
principles are portmanteau concepts consisting of core and penumbral values, and that what 
a given principle requires — and, in terms of judicial intervention, justifies — must be 
assessed in the light of the principle’s interaction with other relevant principles. Miller, 
meanwhile, serves as a salutary reminder that forensic analysis and reasoned judgement are 
central to the judicial role — and that eschewal of those curial techniques in favour of a free-
wheeling, instinctual approach amounts to a form of overreach in itself.  
Evans 
In Evans, a ministerial veto power in the Freedom of Information Act 2000 was deployed so 
as to override a judgment of the Upper Tribunal56 — a superior court of record57 — ordering 
that correspondence between the Prince of Wales and Government Ministers be released. On 
judicial review, the use of the executive veto was quashed, a plurality (consisting of three of 
the five majority judges) construing it so narrowly as to render it exercisable only in 
extremely narrow, and unlikely, circumstances. So emaciated was the veto power left by that 
construction that Lord Hughes (dissenting) said that the power had been rendered 
‘vestigial’,58 while Lord Wilson (also dissenting) said that the plurality ‘did not … interpret’ 
the relevant provision but ‘re-wrote it’.59 While the plurality had ‘invoked precious 
constitutional principles’ in support of their conclusion, it was necessary to recall that 
‘among the most precious [of those principles] is that of parliamentary sovereignty’,60 the 
implication being that the plurality had that ‘most precious’ principle. A number of 
commentators appear to agree, and Evans has attracted notable charges of judicial 
overreach.61  
                                                        
55 J A G Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42 Modern Law Review 1, 19.  
56 Evans v Information Commissioner [2012] UKUT 313 (AAC). 
57 Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (UK) c 15, s 3(5).  
58 R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] AC 1787, [156]. 
59 Ibid [168]. 
60 Ibid [168] 
61 See eg Richard Ekins and Christopher Forsyth, Judging the Public Interest: The Rule of Law 
vs the Rule of Courts (Policy Exchange, 2015). 
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Are those charges warranted? If, as suggested above, constitutional principles are best 
thought of as portmanteau concepts that stand for a range of propositions — some 
penumbral, some axiomatic — then the requirement that courts apply legislation in a way 
that reflects some plausible reading of the statutory text surely lies at the very core of the 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty. It is the assault that Evans appears to make upon that 
axiomatic element of the sovereignty principle that renders it especially suspect. Of course, it 
is generally recognised that even this core requirement affords judges some latitude, such 
that more creative, or strained, interpretations are acceptable if a more literal reading of the 
provision would threaten a fundamental constitutional value. But the fact that the plurality 
assigned to the veto provision a construction that rendered it something close to a dead letter 
might well be thought to signify that any interpretive latitude was plainly exceeded.  
It is important, however, to bear in mind that the strength of the plurality’s response to the 
veto provision was doubtless a function of the extent of its incompatibly with constitutional 
fundamentals other than sovereignty. As they put it, a generous veto power would ‘cut across 
… constitutional principles’ that are ‘fundamental components of the rule of law’,62 by 
‘flout[ing]’ the notion that judicial decisions cannot be ignored by anyone, ‘least of all … the 
executive’, and by ‘stand[ing] … on its head’ the axiom that administrative action ‘must be 
subject to judicial scrutiny’.63 Such propositions are not merely penumbral features of the 
rule of law; they lie at its core. Whether that justifies the radical interpretive approach of the 
plurality depends ultimately upon how the relationship between the relevant principles is 
understood, and upon the relative weight that is assigned to them. The plurality, self-
evidently, considered their construction of the veto power to reflect an appropriate 
accommodation of the respective demands of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law. 
The political branches could, of course, have retaliated; indeed, a legislative response was 
initially threatened,64 but the threat was subsequently withdrawn such that the veto power 
remains in the statute book, unamended.65  
It would be simplistic to say that from this episode we can infer that the plurality has ‘won’, 
that Parliament has accepted its view, and that that is an end of the matter. But it would be 
equally simplistic to suggest that the plurality acted in a straightforwardly unconstitutional 
way. The plurality was, on any reasonable view, certainly exploring the boundaries of judicial 
authority in Evans. But the precise location of that boundary — and the extent to which it is 
legitimate for judges to push the envelope of their authority in circumstances in which a 
more normal interpretive approach would itself yield an ‘unconstitutional’ outcome, in the 
sense of assaulting a fundamental principle such as the rule of law — must, in a system like 
the UK’s, to some extent fall to be inferred from the process of inter-institutional negotiation 
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news/2015/mar/26/cameron-concedes-defeat-publication-prince-charles-letters>. 
65 Ben Quinn, ‘Review decides not to change Freedom of Information Act’, The Guardian 
(online), 1 March 2016 <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/mar/01/freedom-of-
information-review-decides-no-legal-changes-to-act>. 
 Judicial Power and the UK’s Changing Constitution Mark Elliott 
14 
that a judgment like Evans, taken in combination with its political aftermath, represents. 
This does not, however, mean that criticism of Evans falls very wide of the mark, even if it 
does not inevitably hit its target; the undeniable tension, if not incompatibility, between the 
plurality’s judgment and an axiom lying at the core of the sovereignty principle must render 
that judgment suspect, whether or not it makes it ‘wrong’, constitutionally speaking.  
Evans thus illustrates that curial exposure to plausible charges of overreach is, or at least can 
be, a complex function of a series of interlocking factors. Those factors include the extent to 
which judicial intervention appears to threaten a fundamental constitutional principle; the 
extent to which the threat is to a core as distinct from a penumbral aspect of the principle; 
the extent to which the threat might be considered a legitimate means of defence of another 
such principle; the relative weight to be accorded to the principles that are in tension with 
one another; and the extent to which relevant institutional interactions evidence consensus 
(or otherwise) as to the accommodation of competing principles secured by the judgment. 
More specifically, the plurality’s judgment in Evans illustrates a contemporary tendency, 
touched upon earlier in this article, to postulate fundamental constitutional principles as 
phenomena that interact upon a playing field that is more level than traditional theory 
allows.  
Miller 
Evans demonstrates that the judicial overreach klaxon (rightly) sounds ever louder the 
closer a court comes to impinging upon the very essence of a constitutional principle, albeit 
that the alarm might prove to be a false one if matters are evaluated with appropriate 
subtlety. The majority’s judgment in Miller highlights a different, and arguably more 
insidious, form of overreach.66 The case concerned the question of whether the UK 
Government could use its foreign affairs prerogative to notify the European Council of the 
UK’s intention to withdraw from the European Union, thereby initiating the exit process 
provided for in Article 50 of the Treaty on European Union. By a majority of 8–3, the 
Supreme Court held that the foreign affairs prerogative could not be so used. Whereas Evans 
gave rise to understandable concern about the way in which the plurality engaged with 
relevant matters of fundamental principle, Miller raises concerns because of the majority’s 
failure to engage with such matters, at least in a transparent way, in the first place.  
Miller undeniably raised a set of difficult questions, including about the relationship 
between the executive and the legislature, the corresponding relationship between the 
prerogative and Acts of Parliament, and the nature and status of EU law viewed from a UK 
perspective. Unsurprisingly, these questions implicated a rich set of fundamental 
constitutional principles. Against that background, the most striking feature of the majority 
judgment is its signal failure seriously to engage with the content and interaction of those 
principles. It is true that the majority professed to decide the case by reference to ‘long-
standing and fundamental principle’,67 and that it invoked the rhetoric of ‘basic concepts of 
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constitutional law’.68 Yet one searches the judgment in vain for clues as to what those 
‘fundamental principles’ and ‘basic concepts’ might actually be.  
By way of a substitute, the majority instead on platitude masquerading as constitutional 
principle, repeatedly asserting that the legal changes that would be wrought by the initiation 
of the Article 50 process were too great in scale to be realisable via prerogative. Thus, for 
instance, the majority baldly asserted that ‘a major change to UK constitutional 
arrangements can[not] be achieved by ministers alone’.69 Is that proposition the 
‘fundamental principle’ that drove the majority to its conclusion about the unavailability of 
the prerogative? Or is it a function of some other such principle? Accepting the former 
possibility, given the absence of any meaningful attempt in Miller to justify a novel ‘no major 
change without legislation’ principle, would require us to acknowledge that judges can 
conjure constitutional principle from thin air. Yet the latter alternative is equally 
problematic. If the prohibition upon bringing about major change without legislation derives 
its legitimacy from some acknowledged principle, the obvious candidate is parliamentary 
sovereignty. But, on reflection, that cannot be the principle that is at work here. The issue in 
Miller was whether statute, in the form of the ECA, precluded recourse to prerogative, on the 
ground that its use for the purpose of securing the UK’s exit from the EU would be 
incompatible with the scheme set out in that legislation. That question, which the majority 
answered in the affirmative, necessarily turned upon the meaning to be assigned to the ECA 
and upon associated characterisations of the arrangements made by the ECA for the 
domestic effect of EU law. In such circumstances, the sovereignty principle would plainly be 
relevant if the statute, properly interpreted, was understood as precluding recourse to the 
prerogative. At that point, the sovereignty principle would kick in so as to prevent the 
prerogative from being used so as to circumvent the statute. But the sovereignty principle 
could not logically be relevant to the question of whether, in the first place, the statute fell to 
be so interpreted.  
Such is the slipshod nature of the reasoning in Miller that it is hard to escape the conclusion 
that the majority’s gut instinct was that the executive should not be allowed to proceed as it 
wished to, but that it could not quite put its finger on why. As a consequence, it was forced to 
fall back upon the vague and hitherto unknown notion that constitutional changes whose 
scale exceeds a certain (but unstated) threshold cannot be effected without legislation, while 
asserting that such a restriction derived from basic constitutional principles that were never 
identified and whose identity is difficult to infer. That such deficiencies should beset the 
majority judgment in Miller is unfortunate. When the same case was decided by the High 
Court, the judges — who, like their Supreme Court colleagues, ruled that the prerogative was 
unavailable — were dubbed ‘the enemies of the people’,70 on account of the perception, in 
some quarters, that the court was frustrating the popular will manifested in the referendum 
on EU membership held in June 2016. Like most lawyers, I consider that characterisation to 
be wholly inapposite. Miller raised a crucial legal question, and it was the courts’ 
constitutional responsibility to answer it as best they could. However, the legitimacy of 
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judicial intervention, particularly in relation to such politically sensitive matters as those 
raised by Miller, depends upon courts deciding cases on the basis of established legal 
principle in a way that is transparent and adequately reasoned. Whether the majority 
judgment in Miller meets that standard is debateable.  
Conclusion 
Evans and Miller highlight — whether or not they also embody — two distinct forms of 
potential judicial overreach. To the extent that Evans can legitimately be criticised as an 
undue exercise of judicial power, the nature of the alleged overreach must be substantive. 
The plurality in Evans clearly confronted the fundamental constitutional principles that 
were in play and arrived at a view as to what they permitted, in terms of judicial construction 
of the statute, in the particular circumstances of the case. We might agree or disagree with 
the substance of the conclusion at which the plurality arrived, but any contestation at least 
relates to matters that the plurality confronted. Miller is different. It points towards 
(whether or not it realises) the dangers of what might be considered a formal mode of 
judicial overreach: that is, of an adjudicative style, on matters of great constitutional 
sensitivity, that prizes curial instinct over transparent articulation of and rigorous 
engagement with whatever constitutional principles are considered to be in play. This is a 
type of overreach in itself. Exercises of judicial authority are in the first place rendered 
legitimate, among other things, by adherence to the strictures of the adjudicative process. 
And key among those strictures is the discipline of giving rigorously reasoned judgments that 
are, where relevant, rooted in established constitutional principles or in justified inferences 
from or developments of such principles.  
Taken together, substantive and formal judicial overreach supply the conditions for a perfect 
storm from which the judiciary would be unlikely to emerge unscathed. Muscular assertions 
of judicial authority that are unrooted in transparently articulated and defensibly deployed 
fundamental principles are likely, at the very least, to elicit criticism; but it is easy to 
envisage far more substantial consequences. I do not suggest that the British judiciary is 
likely to take this wrong turning; and I certainly do not argue that there is any systematic 
evidence at present that it has done, or is in the process of doing, so. But there is, at the very 
least, the odd warning sign that ought to give pause. Miller is one example. Another includes 
a flight from doctrine on the part of certain judges in some areas of administrative law, a 
notable example being the suggestion — by a Supreme Court Justice, no less — that in 
substantive review cases judges should simply ask themselves ‘whether something had gone 
wrong of a nature and degree which required the intervention of the court’, while leaving it 
‘to the academics to do the theorising’ so that ‘they can tell us what we really meant’ and ‘we 
can make it sound better next time’.71  
My purpose here has not been to demonstrate that the judiciary in the UK is or is not guilty 
of overreach, either generally or in particular cases. It will, nevertheless, be clear by this 
point that I consider some of the criticism that has been levelled at the judiciary to be 
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unwarranted and reactionary, at least to the extent that it assumes that parameters that have 
traditionally constrained the judicial role to be set in aspic rather than recognising them for 
what they are — namely, particular and contestable inferences drawn from fundamental 
principles whose meaning and implications can be properly understood only by reference to 
their interaction at both normative and institutional levels. None of this, however, should be 
mistaken for an assertion that anything goes. For reasons foreshadowed above, the plurality 
in Evans was, in my view, entitled to explore the boundaries of judicial authority by deciding 
the case as it did (just as Parliament was entitled, in enacting the veto power in the first 
place, to explore the boundaries of what it can legislatively accomplish while exhibiting 
fidelity to constitutional principles other than its own sovereignty). It is inevitable that such 
exploration may, on occasion, involve transgression. And the Heath Robinson nature of the 
UK’s constitution enables it to cope with such circumstances, experimentation in 
institutional interaction being part and parcel of the processes through which constitutional 
points of equilibria are, over time, settled and adjusted. It is, however, imperative that such 
exploration and experimentation occur in ways that are not merely grounded in 
constitutional principle, but that are transparently so grounded — for it is curial adventurism 
that is not demonstrably anchored in the bedrock of principle that rightly signals judicial 
entry into the most dangerous of constitutional territory.  
 
